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According to the permanent income hypothesis with quadratic preferences, savings should
react only to transitory income shocks, but not to permanent shocks. The problem is that
income shock components are not separately observable. I show how the combination of
income realizations with subjective expectations can help to identify separately the
transitory and the permanent shock to income, thus providing a powerful test of the theory.
The empirical analysis is performed on a sample of Italian households drawn from the
1989-1991 Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
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According to the textbook version of the permanent income hypothesis
(PIH), household consumption responds on a one-to-one basis to permanent
income shocks but is nearly insensitive to transitory income shocks.
Equivalently, households save for a rainy day the transitory component of
the income innovation and consume entirely the permanent one. Yet, testing
for the separate effect of income shocks on consumption or saving is
difficult. The main problem is that while the agent may be able to
discriminate between a transitory and a permanent shock, the
econometrician is not. As a result, econometric identification of separate
income shock components remains infeasible.
2
In this paper I show that combining subjective income expectations with
income realizations can help to identify separately the transitory and the
permanent shock to income. This has two main advantages. First, it allows
to examine the cross-section distribution of separate income shocks; second,
it provides a powerful test of the theory.
3 In particular, I test whether
households “save for a rainy day” using data available for a sample of
Italian households drawn from the 1989-1991 Bank of Italy Survey of
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
My estimation strategy has two advantages vis-à-vis previous empirical
studies. First, once income shocks become separately identifiable the
consistency of empirical estimates does not rely on a long time-series of
observations for each individual, a problem that plagues most of the
empirical studies. Second, the direct observability of the individual’s
superior information set minimizes the problem of low power of the
instruments used to test the theory.
To assess the validity of the PIH, I regress savings on income shocks. If
the theory is true, only transitory shocks should explain saving. However,
2 Attempts in the direction of estimating the separate effect of transitory and permanent income
shocks on consumption include Hall and Mishkin (1982) on PSID data, and Flavin (1981) on
aggregate US data.
3  Campbell (1987) shows that it is still feasible to test whether households save “for a rainy day” by
replacing the information set available to the agent by that available to the econometrician. While
consistent under some regularity conditions (see the discussion in Deaton, 1992a, and Flavin,
1993), estimates based on the econometrician’s information set are inefficient.4
households “save for a rainy day” only if they display quadratic preferences;
if preferences admit prudence, precautionary saving can represent a likely
source of failure of the theory. In fact, the estimates of the effect of income
shocks on saving will be inconsistent if the omitted higher moments of the
distribution of income shocks are correlated with their realization. But this
also suggests that one might test for the deviation from the certainty
equivalence assumption augmenting the “saving for a rainy day” equation
with the variance term: if the PIH with quadratic preference is true, the
variance should not explain saving.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a formal
decomposition of the income innovation into a permanent and a transitory
component and shows how subjective expectations of income can help to
identify separately the two components and provide a test of the PIH.
Section 3 presents the data used in this study, while in section 4 I examine
the empirical distribution of shocks. Section 5 presents the results of the
empirical analysis. When heterogeneity in income growth is ignored, the
evidence is supportive of the PIH with a precautionary motive for saving. In
particular, savings do respond to transitory income shocks, but also to
permanent income shocks and higher moments of the distribution of
earnings. However, when heterogeneity is accounted for, the results are not
literally consistent with the PIH. In particular, the effect of transitory shocks
on saving is much tinier, a finding than can be reconciled with high real
interest rates or with the existence of binding liquidity constraints affecting
a sizeable proportion of the population. Section 6 concludes.
4
2. The estimation strategy
In this section I show how to decompose income shocks into a transitory
and a permanent component, and how to determine their separate effect on
saving using the “saving for a rainy day” equation (Campbell, 1987). I also
discuss identification and consider some extensions.
4  An Appendix available upon request contains the wording of the survey question and the
procedure I adopted to construct the variables used in the empirical analysis.5
2.1. Decomposing income shocks in the permanent and the transitory
component
Suppose current income
5 admits the following decomposition (as in
Muth, 1960, and Blundell and Preston, 1998):
y p it it it = + e (1)
where pit is the permanent component of income and eit a transitory shock.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the latter is i.i.d. with constant
variance se
2. Permanent income follows a random walk process of the form:
p p u it it it = + -1 (2)
where uit is the permanent shock; this is assumed to be i.i.d. with constant
variance su
2.
6 I also assume that the transitory and the permanent shocks are
orthogonal to each other at all leads and lags. Combining equations (1) and
(2), one obtains:
D D y u it it it = + e (3)
where D is the first-difference operator.
5  The measure of income that would be more appropriate to test the PIH is disposable family
income net of asset income.
6  The assumption of constant variance for both the transitory and the permanent income shock can
be removed without altering the estimation strategy.6
2.2. The effect of transitory and permanent income shocks on consumption
It is worth elaborating on the effect of transitory and permanent income
shocks on savings. As shown by Campbell (1987), under stringent
assumptions concerning preferences and technology (in particular, quadratic
preferences, intertemporal separability, infinite horizon, a rate of
intertemporal discount set equal to the real interest rate, and the absence of
credit market imperfections), one obtains the following saving “for a rainy
day” equation:
( ) ( ) s
r








t D W (4)
which implies that savings mirror the present discounted value of expected









The implications one derives from equation (5) are well known:
permanent shocks do not matter (because under the conditions above the
optimal rule is to consume them all), and only transitory income shocks
explain saving. Provided transitory and permanent income shocks were
separately identifiable, one could implement the following regression:
sit = b0 + b1 transitory shockit + b2 permanent shockit + error termit (6)
where the error term reflects measurement errors in saving, and test whether
b1@1 and b2=0. This is the main implication of the PIH I will test in the
empirical analysis. Tests of the “saving for a rainy day” based on7
microeconomic data have been performed, among others, by Deaton
(1992a) and Alessie and Lusardi (1997).
7
2.3. Identification
Let’s define E(xit|Wit-1) the subjective expectation of xit given the
individual's information set at time t-1.
8 It is worth pointing out that Wit-1 is
the set of information possessed at individual level; the econometrician's
information set is generally less rich. Using equation (3) and the assumption
of rational expectations, the transitory shock at time t can be exactly
identified by:
( ) eit it it E y = - + D W 1 (7)
Using equations (3) and (7), the permanent shock at time t is exactly
identified by the expression:
( ) ( ) u y E y E y it it it it it it = - + - + D D W D W 1 1 (8)
e.g., the income innovation at time t adjusted by a factor that takes into
account the arrival of new information concerning the change in income
between t and t+1. Thus, given the income process (1)-(2), the transitory and
the permanent shock to income can always be identified provided one
observes, for at least two consecutive time periods, both the conditional
7  In both cases the authors had available short panels (2 years in Deaton and 3 years in Alessie and
Lusardi). Thus their estimates are likely to suffer from the problem of inconsistency firstly
remarked by Chamberlain (1984), even if aggregate shocks are controlled for.
8  Throughout, it is assumed that individual agents form rational expectations.8
expectation and the realization of the variable of interest (disposable family
income, say). This is unthinkable in the presence of realization data only.
9
The 1989 and 1991 SHIW data provide a unique opportunity to perform
the tests of the PIH implied by equation (6). However, a problem with the
SHIW data is that they are not available for consecutive years, but only at
two-year intervals; moreover, subjective expectations stretch over a single
calendar year (see section 3 for more details). More precisely, the SHIW
data provide information on yit, yit-2, sit, sit-2,  ( ) E yit it D W - - 1 2  and
( ) E yit it D W +1 , with t=1991. It can be seen that, given equations (7) and (8),
the following expressions:  ( ) - = + E yit it it D W 1 e ,  ( ) - = - - - E yit it it D W 1 2 2 e ,
and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) y y E y E y u u it it it it it it it it - - + = + - - - + - 2 1 2 1 1 D W D W  identify the
transitory shock at time t, the transitory shock at time t-2, and the sum of
the permanent shocks at time t and t-1, respectively.
10 Since under the null
of the PIH savings depend only upon transitory innovations, that is all we
need to implement the estimation of equation (6).
2.4. Consistency
The consistency of the saving equation estimates relies on a large cross-
section dimension, rather than on a large time-series dimension, as is usually
9  Note that the identification of the income shocks carries over exactly as in equations (7) and (8) if
income in levels includes fixed unobservable heterogeneity, i.e. if: yit=li+pit+eit. This is because
income shocks are identified from income changes. This also implies that eit=-E(Dyit+t|Wit) for all
t>0, as future transitory and permanent shocks have all mean zero. The identification strategy is
also robust to an income process of the form: yit=git+mt+pit+eit, where git and mt capture
stochastic life-cycle and business-cycle effects, respectively (i.e., E(git+t|Wit)=E(mt+t|Wit)=0 for all
t>0). In this case, it is easy to show that: sit=(1+r)
-1(git+mt+eit). The subjective expectation
-E(Dyit+1|Wit) would now identify the composite error term (git+mt+eit), with the permanent shock
still identified by equation (8). A regression of sit on the subjective expectation -E(Dyit+1|Wit)
would still provide us with an estimate of the marginal propensity to save out of a transitory shock
to income, the structural parameter we are interested in. Note also that deterministic life-cycle
effects can be easily accommodated by noting that ageit+t=ageit+t.
10 It turns out that if transitory shocks are serially correlated, subjective expectations no longer
identify income shocks. This is my main identifying assumption.9
required. This is simply because we do observe the innovation in savings.
Indeed, under the null hypothesis of the PIH, the residual term of equation
(6) is assumed to reflect only (additive) measurement errors in saving.
Hence, the consistency of my estimates rests only on the weak assumption
that the cross-section dimension of the sample is large and that measurement
errors in saving are not correlated across individuals in the cross-section.
These are, of course, weaker conditions than the ones usually required in
tests of the Euler equation or of the PIH. Indeed, the availability of income
expectations makes practically irrelevant Chamberlain’s critique (1984).
11
2.5. Testing for quadratic preferences
If we relax the assumption of quadratic preferences, there is no longer a
closed form solution for consumption or savings. Moreover, the error term
of the untractable saving equation will contain higher moments of the
distribution of income shocks that are likely to be correlated with their
realizations; if this is the case, estimates will prove inconsistent. But this
also suggests that one can test for the validity of the quadratic preferences
assumption by augmenting the “saving for a rainy day” equation by higher
moments of the distribution of income; under the null hypothesis of the PIH
with quadratic preferences, higher moments should not explain saving.
12
3. The data
I estimate various versions of the “saving for a rainy day” equation using
the 1989-1991 panel section of the Bank of Italy Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW). One of the main features of this data set is that
11 Chamberlain’s critique states that optimization errors average out over time but not necessarily
across households in a cross-section. In Pistaferri (1998) I test for the relevance of Chamberlain’s
critique by noting that under the null of the PIH I do observe the innovation in savings. This
allows the calculation of the empirical covariance between the latter and lagged instruments.
12 Note that a regression of savings on the transitory shock and the conditional variance of income
can be seen as a generalization of Caballero’s model (1990) with CARA preferences.10
it collected subjective information on future income in both 1989 and
1991.
13 The 1989 and 1991 SHIW have been used by Guiso, Jappelli and
Terlizzese (1992) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (1997) to test various
hypothesis related to the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis.
Several surveys contain subjective income expectations, but vary
considerably as to the way expectations are elicited. In the case of the
SHIW, in 1989 and 1991 each labour income and pension recipient
interviewed was asked to attribute probability weights, summing to 100, to
given intervals of inflation and nominal income increases one year ahead.
A problem with these data is that subjective expectations are not reported
as for 1989 (1991), but in the following year, usually between March and
September, although income, consumption and wealth data refer to the
previous calendar year. The reason is that previous experience has shown
that people report income more accurately when filing the income tax forms,
which must be returned by May 31. I thus need to assume that people do not
update their information set between the end of 1989 (1991) and the date of
the interview, or that their updating does not affect subjective expectations
of income. This can be a strong assumption if people receive important
news about the evolution of their future income between the end of 1989
(1991) and the date of the interview;
14 the problem is somewhat less serious
if one recalls that in Italy labour contracts are renewed in the Fall (usually
between October and December).
Note that people report one-year-ahead expectations referring to the rate
of growth of their earnings; to obtain the one-year-ahead expectations of
changes in earnings that would identify the transitory earnings shocks, I
simply solve for the expected change in earnings. Given the assumptions on
the timing of the expectations, the computation of the latter is simple. First,
I define: E(Gyit,t+1|Wit), the expected growth rate of income between year t
and year t+1 (where t=1989 or 1991). Note that this rate is defined in real
terms. Then, I derive: E(Dyit+1|Wit)=yitE(Gyit,t+1|Wit).
Although each labour income recipient is asked to answer the survey
question, I rely only on the information provided by the head of the
13 Subjective expectations are also asked in the 1995 SHIW, but differ quite radically from those I
use in this paper.
14 The same assumption has been made implicitly in all the papers quoted in this section.11
household or, if the latter are lacking, on those provided by the spouse. The
reason is that in most cases information on income recipients other than the
head or spouse is lacking.
15
4.  The empirical distribution of the income shocks
Table 1 allows to examine the cross-section distribution of income
shocks for the sample that includes heads or spouses (1,102 households).
16
For the sake of comparison, income shocks are divided by current earnings;
hence, they can be interpreted in relative terms. Since we have only
available the sum of permanent shocks in 1990 and 1991, the figures in the
first column should be read as the ratio of average permanent shock between
1990 and 1991 and earnings in 1991. The next two columns focus on the
relative transitory shocks in 1991 and 1989, respectively.
In 1991 average earnings featured a negative innovation of about 1.3
percent in real terms; the decomposition into transitory and permanent
shocks, however, shows that while the permanent component plays a
negative role (-4.5 percent on average), the transitory shock is positive
(+3.2 percent on average).
Permanent shocks are negative for all population groups; however, the
effect is stronger for the self-employed, the middle aged, the more educated,
and the poor (as measured by family income quartiles). As for the transitory
shocks in 1991, these are higher for those approaching the retirement, with
few years of schooling, and living in the north. While still positive on
average, the transitory earnings shock in 1989 is not as large as in 1991 (1.4
percent vis-á-vis 3.2 percent), and it is even negative for few population
groups (the very young and the most educated).
An average permanent shock of -4.5 percent is not negligible. On the
other hand, there is an increasing body of evidence (Miniaci and Weber,
1996; Bertola and Ichino, 1996) showing that in the early 1990s Italian
15 In other words, I regress saving on the head’s earnings shocks, rather than on the shocks referring
to disposable family income.
16 For 95 percent of our sample, we use information directly pertaining to the head of the household.12
households perceived a negative permanent change in their lifetime income.
This was due to various reasons: radical political changes, pay freezing in
the public sector that spread to the private sector through income policy
experiments, increasing taxation aimed at meeting the Maastricht Treaty
criteria, pension and labour market reforms, etc.
In particular, in 1991 the wage indexation clause (scala mobile) was
abolished and the laws regulating the hiring process were dramatically
renewed with the aim of relaxing labour market regulations. It has been
argued that the former had the effect of increasing earnings inequality after
decades of compression in the earnings differentials, while the latter had the
effect of increasing earnings uncertainty because of job instability (Bertola
and Ichino, 1996).
The income policy experiments were introduced as transitory measures
aimed at freezing pay rise after years of unnecessary adjustments; ex post,
some of these measures seem to have permanently reduced wages’
purchasing power.
In our context, pension reforms can be important to an extent that
depends on how much the prospective income power of those who are
currently working is affected. Due to the unprecedented unbalance between
contributors and beneficiaries in the Italian pay-as-you-go social security
system, both the Amato and the Dini reforms (the two main reforms
implemented in the early 90s, named after the prime ministers who signed
them) went in the direction of cutting future benefits and increasing
contributions.
Finally, labour market and pension reforms were accompanied by an
increase in taxation. The population group that is likely to have suffered
more from the introduction of new fiscal measures is the self-employed. In
particular, the self-employed were hit by the introduction of a minimum tax,
which based tax payments on the presumption of a minimum annual
income. The radical changes in political attitudes towards tax non-
compliance and the introduction of stricter measures for tax enforcement
might have contributed to strengthen the perception of a decline in the
permanent income for this group.
A final remark is that we only observe a snapshot of the distribution of
earnings shocks in 1989 and 1991; a thorough analysis of how people form
and change their expectations in the face of idiosyncratic and aggregate
events would require a longer period of observations, which would ease the
task of disentangling life-cycle from business-cycle related shocks.13
Unfortunately, subjective expectations are rarely asked in survey data, and
in the case of the SHIW, they were asked in the format used in this paper
only in 1989 and 1991.
5. Empirical results
Table 2 presents the result of estimating the “saving for a rainy day”
equation for the sample of heads and spouses (1,102 households). We
estimate three basic regressions: (i) the one implied by equation (5), with
only the transitory income shock included as an explanatory variable, and
then including separately: (ii) the permanent income shock, and (iii) the
conditional variance of income. The latter can be easily derived from the
data on subjective expectations. Note that the OLS regressions for
specifications (i) and (iii) can be estimated for both 1989 and 1991 as they
do not involve lagged variables; thus in these cases the sample size is twice
as large as the one for specification (ii). OLS estimates for the three models
above are presented in columns (1)-(3) of table 2. I trim the sample at the
bottom and top percentile of the distribution of saving to avoid my estimates
being contaminated by influential outliers. Standard errors are robust to the
presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form. Saving is defined as the
difference between family disposable income and non-durable consumption;
I also experimented defining saving as the difference between family
disposable income and total consumption and found no appreciable
difference in the pattern of results.
The results of estimating equation (5) are supportive of the PIH with
rational expectations. Column (1) shows that savings strongly react to
transitory income shocks (a point estimate of 0.71). The hypothesis that the
propensity to save out of a transitory earnings shock is one has a p-value of
27 percent. The null hypothesis that the coefficient on the transitory shock
equals (1+r)
-1 was also tested by considering a grid of possible values for
the real interest rate ranging from 0 to 10 percent;
17 in no case did I reject
the null hypothesis.
17 The average real interest rates in 1991 were: 0.58 percent (deposits), 5.58 percent (Treasury
bonds), and 4.32 percent (other assets, including shares). Interest rates in 1989 were very similar
to those for 1991.14
In column (2) I add to the main specification in levels the sum of the
permanent income shocks in periods t and t-1. This raises the problem that
we cannot separately identify the effect of the permanent shocks at two
different dates. The problem can be handled by noting that under the null
hypothesis of the PIH with quadratic preferences both coefficients are zero,
and so should be the coefficient attached to the sum of the current and past
permanent income shocks. The results show that the null hypothesis is
rejected: permanent income shocks are significant predictors of household
savings. Nevertheless, the size of the coefficient is tiny: the null hypothesis
that the transitory shock and the permanent shock equally affect savings is
strongly rejected (a p-value of 0.32 percent). Taken at face value, these
results suggest that households save not only the transitory income shocks in
their entirety, but also a sizeable portion of their permanent shocks.
Therefore, the certainty equivalence model seems to fail in the sense of
predicting saving rates that are too low (in absolute value) with respect to
the available evidence.
Yet, too much savings can be reconciled with the existence of a
precautionary motive for saving. A piece of evidence strongly in support of
the latter is reported in column (4); here I include the conditional variance of
head’s earnings
18 alongside the transitory shock. The version of the PIH I
have tested so far might fail because preferences are not quadratic. If
individual preferences admit a positive third derivative (e.g., if consumers
are prudent in the sense clarified by Kimball, 1992), the estimates of the
saving for a rainy day equation are inconsistent because of the omission of
higher moments of the distribution of income shocks that are correlated with
the cross-section mean of the transitory shock. The test I conduct is simple.
Under the null of the PIH with quadratic preferences, higher moments of the
distribution of earnings should not matter. The hypothesis is rejected: the
conditional variance of earnings
19 has the expected sign (more uncertainty
should in fact increase current saving) and is statistically significant, thus
suggesting that the assumption of quadratic preferences is inappropriate.
19 This is defined as var(yit+1-yit|Wit)=var(yit+1|Wit). Note that we cannot distinguish between the
variance of the transitory shock and the variance of the permanent shock. The variance term is
obtained from the conditional variance of the rate of growth of future earnings by noting that:
var[(yit+1-yit)/yit|Wit]=yit
-2var(yit+1-yit|Wit).15
This conclusion is supported by previous empirical evidence available from
Italy (Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese, 1992; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 1997).
To confirm the robustness of my findings, I have re-estimated the saving
for a rainy day equation by accounting for preference heterogeneity. In
particular, I assume that the bliss point of household utility is a function of
age, age squared and family size. Results are presented in table 3, columns
(1) to (3). As is clear, the results are not much affected by the introduction
of bliss point heterogeneity.
I have also experimented excluding the elderly (those aged more than 65,
the standard retirement age for males) and the self-employed. The reason to
exclude the elderly is that the decomposition of income shocks between a
transitory and a permanent shock is possibly no longer valid for the retired
or those approaching the retirement; the reason to exclude the self-employed
is that, as reported by Brandolini and Cannari (1994), they tend to
understate or misreport their current earnings; moreover, for this group is
more difficult to separate labour income from asset income. The results
obtained from excluding these two groups are presented in table 4. It is
worth noting that the magnitude of the various effects is not much affected
by such exclusions; on the other hand, the precision of the estimates suffers
from keeping out either population group.
Heterogeneity in savings may also arise from unobservable individual
effects in the income process. Suppose to rewrite equation (3) as:
D D y u it it it i = + + e f (9)
where fi is an idiosyncratic deterministic trend in the income process.
20
Given equation (9), the “saving for a rainy day” equation rewrites:
s
r






20 See Blundell and Preston (1997) for details on the assumptions generating the income process (9).16
where l f i i r =
-1 , and vit is a measurement error in savings. The presence of
unobservable fixed heterogeneity in the saving function might invalidate
simple least squares estimates, in particular if E(eit fi)„0. However, first-
differences estimates are still consistent because the individual effect is
washed out when transforming the data.
21
In columns (4) and (5) of table 2 we present the results of estimating
equation (10) by first-differences. Accounting for heterogeneity leads to
different conclusions as far as the saving function is concerned. As shown in
column (4), the saving equation display point estimates that are much lesser
than those in column (1). The effect of the transitory shock is now only 0.45
(with a robust standard error of 0.22). In columns (5), we present the results
of controlling for both the unobservable heterogeneity and the conditional
variance of earnings. Here again, the results are against the certainty
equivalence model, confirming the practical importance of the heterogeneity
in the income process and the precautionary motive for saving. The
specification tested in columns (4) delivers point estimates that are not
literally consistent with the PIH. In particular, the PIH implied by equation
(5) is consistent only with interest rates of about 30 percent in real terms. A
possible explanation is that agents discount the future at rates higher than
the ones prevailing in the credit market as a device to reduce the uncertainty
related to future resources.
22
However, a modest effect of transitory shocks on saving may hide
binding liquidity constraints. Flavin (1993) proposes the consumption
function to be written as:
( ) c y y ra y it it
P
it it it
P = + + - g (11)
21 Note that, from income process (9), subjective expectations no longer identify exactly the transitory
income shock, because: E(Dyit+1|Wit)=-eit+fi. However, in order to estimate (10) in first-
differences, we only need to identify the change in the transitory income shock, which is provided
by first-differencing the subjective expectations, i.e., from:
E(Dyit+1|Wit)-E(Dyit-1|Wit-2)=-(eit-eit-2).
22 Similar results are obtained when preference heterogeneity is accounted for (see columns (4) and
(5) of table 3), although estimates are slightly less precisely measured.17
where yit
P =















23 According to Deaton
(1992a), the parameter g represents “the extent to which consumption
responds to current income over and above the amount that is warranted by
the PIH”. Thus, the finding that g>0 can be interpreted as a symptom of
liquidity constraints, as liquidity constrained households can increase their
consumption only when income is directly available. It is easy to show that,
using (11), the “saving for a rainy day” equation rewrites:
( )
( ) ( ) s
r









t D W (12)
and then, using again the income process (9), that:
s
r








where  ( ) l g f i i r = - -
- 1
1 . A positive g is consistent with the estimates in
first-differences reported in columns (4). With a real interest rate of 5
percent, say, g is roughly 0.5, implying that liquidity constraints are likely to
be playing an important role.
24 Given the severe imperfections of the Italian
credit markets by the standards of other industrialised countries and the
pervasiveness of various liquidity constraints, particularly in the mortgage
market (Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese, 1994), this result does not come as a
surprise.
23 This term is usually dubbed as “permanent income” (Deaton, 1992b). I will not use such
terminology, because here permanent income is given by the expression (2), i.e. it reflects the
“normal” labour income available to an individual throughout her working career.
24 The magnitude of this coefficient is very similar to that obtained when testing for excess sensitivity
on time series data. Recall that under the null of the PIH with quadratic preferences, estimates
based on time series data are consistent (because of the large T argument) and do not suffer from
aggregation bias.18
6. Conclusions
This paper has presented a test of the PIH with quadratic preferences and
infinite horizon. I have shown that the availability of subjective income
expectations and income realizations allows the exact identification of
transitory and permanent income shocks if data are available for at least two
consecutive time periods. Subjective income expectations are then used to
test the hypothesis that households “save for a rainy day”, e.g. that saving
reacts exclusively to transitory shocks.
The empirical analysis rejects this simple version of the PIH. I have
shown that when heterogeneity is accounted for, savings do react to
transitory income shocks, but the magnitude of the effect is tiny, a finding
that can be reconciled only with very high real interest rates or binding
liquidity constraints. In addition, I have shown that the assumption of
quadratic preferences is inappropriate: higher moments of the distribution of
income should not matter but they do. This finding is supported by previous
evidence, is in agreement with the existence of a precautionary motive for
saving, and is consistent with the theoretical lack of plausibility of the
assumption of increasing risk aversion implied by quadratic preferences.19
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.23
TABLE 2
THE “SAVING FOR A RAINY DAY” EQUATION

















# of observations 2,204 1,102 2,204 1,102 1,102
R
2 0.0085 0.0414 0.0156 0.0070 0.0117
Note: The sample includes 1,044 heads (94.74 percent of the sample) and 58 (5.26 percent)
spouses. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form are reported in
parenthesis. All regressions (except the ones in first-differences) include a constant.24
TABLE 3
THE “SAVING FOR A RAINY DAY” EQUATION:
ACCOUNTING FOR PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY














































# of observations 2,204 1,102 1,102 1,102 1,102
R
2 0.0261 0.0726 0.0788 0.0138 0.0177
Note: The sample includes 1,044 heads (94.74 percent of the sample) and 58 (5.26 percent)
spouses. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form are reported in
parenthesis. All regressions include a constant.25
TABLE 4
THE “SAVING FOR A RAINY DAY” EQUATION: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Excluding those aged over 65 Excluding the self-employed





















# of observations 1,834 899 1,834 1,800 903 1,800
R
2 0.0069 0.0417 0.0136 0.0058 0.0272 0.0087
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form are reported in
brackets. All regressions include a constant.